European regional growth, technology gap and R&D efforts by Lydia Greunz
41
ST CONGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL SCIENCE 
ASSOCIATION 
ZAGREB, 29 AUGUST – 1 SEPTEMBER 2001 
 
“European Regional Development Issues in the New 
Millennium and Their Impact on Economic Policy” 
 
SESSION: 
REGIONAL GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE 
 
European regional growth, technology gap and R&D efforts 
 
Lydia Greunz, Université Libre de Bruxelles, DULBEA, CERT CP-140 
50, Av. F.D. Roosevelt, B-1050 Bruxelles 
(lgreunz@ulb.ac.be) 
 
Key words: technology gap, “social capability”, European convergence. 
 
Abstract:  This paper aims at testing the technology gap hypothesis in order to explain the growth 
patterns of European regions. After a review of the related literature, we construct a simultaneous 
equation model of cumulative growth where catching up is driven by “social capability”. This model is 
applied on an extended sample of 153 European NUTS I and NUTS II regions. The FIML estimates are 
used to cluster the sample of European regions with respect to their growth paths. Globally, 30 % of 
European regions should converge to the level of development achieved by the tree best performing ones. 
About 57 % of European regions move to their own steady state level of GDP per capita but never catch 
up the frontier regions and for 13 % relative backwardness seems to be a recurrent issue of the growth 
mechanism. 
   1
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early days of European economic integration, one of the central goals for the European Union 
has been greater equality of income and productivity among member states and regions. As shown by 
Barro (1991), Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996), and Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls (1997), this goal 
has been achieved for a long time. Indeed, from the early 1950s onwards, differences in GDP per capita 
within European regions declined steadily. However, more recently, the process of European economic 
convergence has slowed down considerably and, according to a widening group of economists, has 
ceased at the regional level after 1980 (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996; Tondl 1997; Beine and Philippe 
2000).  
The scholarly work on convergence is largely based on the traditional neo-classical theory of economic 
growth. In its initial formulation, all countries and regions should converge to the same level of economic 
development provided that economic agents are endowed with the same tastes and benefit from the same 
access to technology
1. Within the various assumptions, the one, which probably raises most doubts about 
its degree of relevance in a regional context, seems to be the hypothesis of immediate diffusion of 
knowledge. The issues of space and distance and also the time it needs to bridge the distance are 
completely ignored within the traditional neo-classical model.  
In contrast to the neo-classical theory, “endogenous growth” models have focused on the possibility of 
divergent growth paths between countries or regions (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Temple 1999). This 
approach considers that the national accumulation of knowledge and technology is basically endogenous 
so that countries and regions build their own technological know-how instead of having free access to an 
international stock of blueprints from which they extract techniques to be brought into operation at home. 
Research on technology diffusion and technology gaps within countries and regions was deepened during 
the 1980s. In this setting, concepts of “catching up” and “falling behind” play an important role and 
attempt to explain the differences in growth rates between countries or regions (Chappelen, Fagerberg and 
Verspagen 1999; Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996; Amable 1993; Fingleton 2000). Within the technology 
gap literature a variety of ideas is brought forward with respect to the specific way convergence is 
perceived
2. In particular, two fundamentally different schools of thought can be distinguished. For the 
first one, the main idea underlying the technology gap approach is that technological differences between 
countries or regions, opens up the possibility for countries at a lower level of economic and technological 
development to catch up by imitating the more productive technologies of the leading country (Fagerberg 
1987). The basic foundation for such an “advantage in backwardness” is that imitating foreign best 
practices is supposed to be considerably less costly than to innovate. However, technology is not assumed 
to be a perfect public good in the sense that it is equally available to everybody free of charge. It is argued 
that successful adoption of new technology is generally costly and typically requires what Abramovitz 
(1986) calls “social capability” and “technological congruence”. “Social capability” refers to factors that 
facilitate the imitation of a technology or the implementation of technology spillovers. “Technological 
congruence” concerns the extent to which the country is “technologically near” to the leading country and 
captures the ability of a country to apply the technical features from new knowledge. The second school   2
of thought considers that the accumulation of knowledge is basically endogenous. This consideration 
comes close to the preoccupation of Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1966) on cumulative causation and the 
possibilities of divergent growth. Within this alternative view, economies are largely considered as if they 
were mutually independent, each moving along its own balanced growth path. Technological gaps and, as 
a consequence, productivity gaps would have to arise since the (constant) productivity growth rates differ. 
Put differently, for Kaldor and some of the endogenous growth theorists, countries follow their own 
national growth paths, building their own technological capabilities, with, as a corollary, little tendency 
for convergence in income or productivity levels.  
Amable (1993) tried to integrate the two different schools of thought in adopting a “broad” Kaldorian 
view where growth takes place in a context of cumulative causation. He tested whether catching up has 
taken place during the period 1960-85 in considering a cross section of 59 developed and developing 
countries and using a system of equations with variables expressed in terms of averages over the 
considered period. His results suggest a general pattern of equilibrium divergence rather than 
convergence in productivity levels. In a recent study, Fingleton (2000) takes up the idea investigated by 
Amable as well as his data set. With respect to Amable’s study, the most important new hypothesis tested 
by Fingleton is that a country’s level of technology influences the neighbouring country’s R&D activity 
and thus its productivity and output growth. His system of equation’s estimates support this hypothesis 
which, in a less restrictive manner, has already been put forward in the recent literature (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991, 1994; Coe and Helpman 1995; Verspagen 1997).  
While Amable and Fingleton have investigated the catching up hypothesis for a cross section sample of 
59 developed and developing countries, the aim of this paper is to concentrate the analysis onto an 
extended sample of European regions. It is worth mentioning that our sample is considerably larger than 
the ones used in related studies. Whereas the latter uses generally NUTS I samples (about 60 regions), our 
sample contains a total of 153 NUTS I and NUTS II regions. Another novelty of this paper with respect to 
the studies of Amable and Fingleton relies in the introduction of R&D expenditures into the catching-up 
framework.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section explains the system of equations of our 
catching up model and the role and interactions of the variables included. After investigating some 
theoretical aspects, the model is tested at the European regional level. In particular, the crucial role of 
“social capability” for the catching up process is discussed. The estimation output is used to cluster 
European regions with respect to their level of steady state GDP per capita. Some salient observations 
about this clustering precede our conclusions, policy implications and suggestions for further research. 
2. A  CATCH UP MODEL FOR THE EUROPEAN REGIONS 
2.1.  The model and the role of variables 
In our model growth takes place in a context of cumulative causation similar to the approach of Amable 
and Fingleton. Two factors influence the cumulative mechanisms. The first one is innovative activity 
measured by patent activity and the second one is the structure of the productive system approximated by 
the proportion of industrial and service employment. Interactions between these factors and the   3
technology gap constitute the growth dynamics. In addition to these endogenous components, “social 
capability” is captured by the following variables: an indicator of physical infrastructure, a measure of the 
level of qualification of the working age population and real R&D expenditures. The model can be 
formulated in the following way:  
y =  a1 + b1 G + c1 IS + d1 K + e1  Q       (1) 
IS = a2 + b2 y + c2 P        ( 2 )  
P = a3 + b3 G + c3 Q + d3 R&D       ( 3 )  
where variables
3 are expressed in terms of averages over the period 1989-96 and where 
y  is the growth rate of real GDP expressed in terms of PPA deflated by the GDP deflator with 
respect to the price level of 1990; 
G  is the technology gap in 1989 measured as the regional level of real GDP per capita expressed in 
terms of PPA deflated by the GDP deflator with respect to the price level of 1990 relative to that of 
the three most performing regions (Bruxelles, Hamburg, Île-de-France)
 4; 
IS  is the percentage of employment in industry and services with respect to total employment; 






where kmmot is the 
number of kilometres of motorways, pop is population and km
2 is the surface of the region; 
Q  is proportion of highly and moderately qualified working age population (25 to 59 years) relative 
to total working age population; 
P  is the number of patents for 1000 inhabitants; 
R&D  is R&D business expenditure per capita in PPS deflated by the GDP deflator with respect to the 
price level of 1990. 
Intuitively one expects: b1 > 0, c1 > 0, d1 > 0, e1 > 0, b2 > 0, c2 > 0, b3 < 0, c3 > 0, d3 > 0. 
Equation (1) states that the regional growth rate depends on the initial technology gap (G), the 
employment concentration in industry and services (IS), physical infrastructure (K) and the qualification 
levels of the working age population (Q).  
The technology gap variable (G) captures the idea that technological differences between regions allow 
the lagging ones to catch up with the leading ones by imitating their more productive technologies. It is in 
this sense that a technology gap reflects an “advantage in backwardness”. Abramovitz (1986, 1989) 
argues that backwardness carries an opportunity for modernisation and faster growth. However, the actual 
catch up is largely dependent on a region’s ability to pick up this opportunity. Put differently, the 
existence of a technology gap offers a potential for faster growth but the realisation of this potential 
depends on factors that are space (and time) dependent. As a measure of the technology gap, the level of 
real GDP per capita relative to that of the three best performing regions has been chosen
5.  
The structure of the productive system of a region is one of the elements that allows to pick up the 
opportunity of backwardness. We approach it by the employment concentration in industry and services 
(IS). Neither Amable nor Fingleton do consider this variable. However, a high dependence on agriculture 
has been shown to be determinant of low regional growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996), among other   4
things because of low technological opportunities, and slow growth of the market. Regarding the share of 
industry in total employment, traditionally, manufacturing industry has been considered as an “engine of 
growth” (Kaldor 1966). However, in recent years, technological progress largely occurs in the service 
sector (OCDE 1996, 1997). To cover both arguments our variable includes employment in industry and 
services
6. Actually, the relation between the structure of the region’s productive system and its growth 
performance is simultaneous
7. This fact is captured by equation (2) which postulates that the rate of 
growth of demand addressed to a region (y) will boost employment essentially industry and services. 
Patent activity (P) has similar effects. Innovative activities in a region reflect not only its ability to 
develop new technologies but also its capacity to absorb technologies developed elsewhere. The outcome 
of this process is increased competitiveness that allows to maintain or to increase the employment level in 
industry and services. 
Another important component of a region’s “social capability” is considered to be the qualification level 
of the working age population (Q). The technical competence of the labour force and the availability of 
various skills are essential to absorb technologies developed elsewhere as well as developing one’s own. 
Different tests have been performed in order to determine whether only high qualification or also 
moderate qualification is relevant. Both of them turned out to be parts of “social capability”. Amable and 
Fingleton choose primary and secondary education to capture the human capital component of “social 
capability”. With respect to the time period covered by our sample, these variables do not represent a 
region’s ability to integrate new technologies and to benefit from spillover effects. If a relatively short 
time period is examined as in our framework, it is the qualification level of today’s working age 
population that represents “social capability” and not the qualification level of tomorrow’s.  
Capital-embodied technology (K) plays an important role in the catching up process. Amable and 
Fingleton used the ratio of equipment investment over GDP to capture this component of the catching up 
mechanism. This variable is not available for the European regions. In this paper, we adopt the approach 
of Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) in using as an approximation to the private investment 
variable an indicator of physical infrastructure (based on the density of motorways in a region). Physical 
infrastructure is a main component of a region’s attractiveness. A region’s attractiveness in its turn is a 
main determinant of private investment (Quinet 1992). Furthermore, physical infrastructure is supposed 
to have a positive impact on technology diffusion, since a more developed infrastructure increases the 
profitability, reduces the cost of introducing new technologies and speeds up the diffusion process
8.  
Variables representing the level of innovative activity such as R&D expenditures should be viewed as 
prime candidates for explaining differences in catching up since an effort in innovation is often a 
precondition for successful imitation in so far as it feeds the “knowledge base” (Dosi 1988) upon which a 
country builds its technical competence. Having an innovative activity confers an expertise that facilitates 
the assimilation of knowledge developed elsewhere, and thus magnifies the R&D spillovers (OECD 
1999). Equation (3) takes into account this important catching up component which has not been 
considered by Amable nor by Fingleton. As far as R&D expenditures are concerned, they should 
positively influence the patenting activity, a measure of R&D output. In our model, only business sector 
R&D expenditures are taken into account since for higher education R&D expenditures as well as   5
government R&D expenditures, the link with the patenting activity is more complex and takes time. In 
this context and since our model is based on average values over the period 1989-96, higher education 
R&D expenditures and government R&D expenditures turned out not to be significant.  
It is worth mentioning that the “social capability” has often been treated as exogenous, but there are 
strong reasons to consider that the elements that we have chosen to represent it are, at least partly, 
endogenous to the growth process. In fact, the cumulative aspect of the growth mechanism is reinforced if 
one admits that innovative activity measured by patenting activity or employment concentration in 
industry and services are positively associated with the level of development. A high initial technology 
gap is generally associated with low values of these variables, which in turn prevent high economic 
growth. Among the components of “social capability”, innovative activity is the most likely to be 
dependent on the technological level of a region. Regions that suffer from a substantial technology gap 
are expected to have a weak innovative performance. A weak innovative performance in turn is generally 
associated with a low capability to integrate knowledge developed elsewhere. For regions with a low 
initial level of technological capability, the distance to the countries at the technological frontier is too 
important to benefit from the spillover effects induced by the latter. For this reason, patenting activity, 
taken as an indicator of innovation, should be a negative function of the technology gap. The contrary 
should be observed for innovation efforts in terms of R&D expenditures as well as for the qualification 
level of the labour force.  
2.2.  Theoretical implications of the model 
Coming back to the model described in the previous section it is useful to work out its reduced form and 
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Given that the technology gap is defined as:  R
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where Y and Y* are respectively the GDP per capita of the lagging region and of the three leading ones 
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where Q*, R&D* and K* are the values of highly and moderately qualified working age population, 
business R&D expenditures and endowment of physical infrastructure applying to the leading countries.  
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In replacing G by its alternative expression (1-R) in equation (7) and in taking account of the expression 
(8), it is possible to infer from equation (7) the dynamics of R: 
2
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In steady state  0
.
= R so that the equilibrium ratio of GDP per capita of lagging regions over GDP per 
capita of frontier regions, that we denote R
SS, can be expressed in the following way: 
β
α = SS R  (12) 
The above formulation indicates that the steady state ratio of GDP per capita of a region over GDP per 
capita of the frontier regions is a function of the region’s current deficit/excess in terms of qualification, 
R&D activities as well as endowment of physical infrastructure.  
2.3.  Testing the model  
The model is tested on the European regional landscape over the period 1989-96. A total of 153 European 
regions are covered by the sample which is composed of 120 NUTS II regions, 31 NUTS I regions and 2 
NUTS 0 regions. For the latter - The Netherlands and Ireland - no regional data on R&D is available. This 
is also the case for Açores and Madeira. Belgian regions could only be covered at the NUTS I level. As 
far as Danish regions are concerned, aggregations of NUTS III regions have been performed since R&D 
data are only available in this aggregated form. Germany’s new Länder as well as Luxembourg were 
excluded as R&D data does not exist for these regions.  
Table 1 summarises the main empirical findings. One can observe that all the coefficients have the 
expected signs and all of them except one are significant at the 5 % level. Goodness of fit is acceptable. 
Together, these two elements confirm (or at least do not contradict) our reflections about the functioning 
of the catching up mechanism, the role of variables and their interactions. The FIML method has been 
used to estimate the system of equations
9. Each equation in the system has been separately tested for 
omitted variables, misspecification and normality of error terms using the Ramsey’s regression 
specification error test. For each of them, the hypothesis of omitted variables, misspecification and non 
normality of error terms was rejected at the 5 % level. 
Table 1: Estimates of the system of equations of the catching up model 
 y  =  -0.22  +  0.05 G  +  0.18 IS  +  0.34 K  +  0.04 Q (1) 
   (-2.82)   (2.39)   (1.89)*  (3.41)   (1.99)  R
2=0.59, SE=0.02 
 IS  =  0.85  +  1.40 y  +  0.54 P           (2)   7
    (71.42)   (2.98)   (4.75)          R
2=0.45, SE=0.07 
 P  =  0.06  -  0.16 G  +  0.09 Q  +  0.27 R&D     (3) 
    (1.84)   (-4.86)  (2.68)   (7.73)       R
2=0.75, SE=0.04 
 Estimation method: FIML, Log likelihood: 1190.44; 
 t-statistics between brackets; 
 number of observations: 150 + 3 leading regions; 
 * significant at the 6% level. 
 
A comparison with the results obtained by Amable and Fingleton seems relatively difficult. Neither the 
covered periods nor the included variables are identical. The only comparable variable in terms of units is 
the technology gap. The coefficients obtained by Amable and Fingleton are respectively 0.04 and 0.02 
while it turns out to be 0.05 in our setting. Despite differences in the sample sizes (59 in the Amable and 
Fingleton models and 153 in ours), the respective periods (1960-85 in the Amable and Fingleton models 
and 1989-96 in ours), as well as the model specifications, our coefficient is not statistically different from 
the one obtained by Amable.  
Table 2: Testing the role of “social capability” 
Dependent variable: y  First equation of the 






constant (a1) -0.22  (-2.82)  -0.21 (-7.25)  -0.25 (-8.02) 
G (b1) 0.05  (2.39)  0.06 (3.63)  0.14 (3.59) 
IS (c1) 0.18  (1.89)*  0.15 (5.11)  0.16 (5.81) 
K (d1) 0.34  (3.41)  0.30 (2.76)  0.32 (2.90) 
Q (e1) 0.04  (1.96)  0.05 (6.50)  0.11 (4.27) 







Number of observations: 150 + 3 leading regions; 
Heteroskedasticity consitent t-statistics between brackets; 
* significant at the 6 % level. 
 
While the results reported at Table 1 globally supports the theoretical foundation put forward in the 
technology gap literature, it does not allow one to verify explicitly the main hypothesis driving the 
catching up process. This hypothesis can be formulated as follows: catching up in the context of 
technological backwardness can only be realised if “social capability” is sufficiently developed to imitate 
best practices developed elsewhere. In order to test this assumption more directly, let us consider 
qualification as the representative component of “social capability” and let us concentrate on the first 
equation of the system which has been augmented by a new variable, the product of the technology gap 
and “social capability”. Table 2 shows the alternative result obtained with this additional variable.  
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimation output and, in particular, the negative sign 
associated with the new variable G.Q, it is useful to reformulate the first equation of the “extended 
model” in the following way: 
y = -0.25 + G ( 0.14 – 0.13 Q ) + 0.16 IS + 0.32 K + 0.12 Q      (13) 
        (a1)           (b1)       (f1)             (c1)         (d1)          (e1)   8
This formulation allows one to distinguish easily the different effects related to an increase in “social 
capacity”. Firstly, as stated previously and captured by the coefficient (e1), an increase of “social 
capability” positively influences the growth performance. Secondly, and according to the technology gap 
literature, a relatively high technology gap offers the opportunity for faster growth. This effect is captured 
by the coefficient (b1). Now, if “social capability” is rising, economic growth is strengthened and, as a 
consequence, the technology gap should reduce. In other words, an increase in “social capability” 
weakens the influence of the technology gap on economic growth (f1) as well as the technology gap itself. 
In fact, a higher degree of “social capability” increases the region’s ability to imitate best practices 
developed elsewhere, which, as a consequence, boosts economic growth and thus reduces the technology 
gap.  
In a less intuitive manner, the partial derivatives of the augmented equation with respect to the two 
variables of interest, G and Q, are shown below. Following GREEN, 2000, these partial derivatives have 















∂  < 0 
It is worth mentioning that business R&D expenditures as well as endowment of physical infrastructure 
have also been tested as alternative representative variables of “social capability”. In these alternative 
settings, the coefficients associated with G.R&D and G.K exhibited the expected signs but did not reach 
the significance level of 10%.  
3. EVALUATING THE GROWTH PATHS OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONS 
3.1.  A regional clustering 
The preceding estimation results can be used to get deeper insight into the respective growth dynamics 
followed by each individual region. In order to determine whether a region is currently engaged in a 
catching-up process, or on the contrary, in a process leading to relative underdevelopment, it is useful to 
evaluate for each region the steady state level of GDP per capita. This is possible by applying the 
theoretical considerations developed previously. The estimated coefficients of the system of equations 
reported in Table 1 and equation (11), although valid on average over the period 1989–96, allow one to 
compute the value of β  which turns out to be 0.05. From equation (10) it is clear that the value of α  varies 
for each region. Using the difference between the regional values and the values computed for the three 
best performing European regions of the exogenous variables, namely the rate of employment of highly 
and moderately qualified working population (Q-Q*), the amount of R&D expenditure per capita (R&D-
R&D*) and the endowment of physical infrastructure (K-K*), one can compute the value of α . From 
equation (12), the equilibrium ratio of GDP per capita, R
SS, for each individual region is straightforward. 
Since β  turns out to be positive, three cases can be distinguished: 
•  case 1: 
α  > 0, β   > 0, R
SS > 1 
•  case 2: 
α  > 0, β   > 0, R
SS ≤  1 
•  case 3: 
α  < 0, β   > 0, R
SS ≤  0
11 
 
In case 1, whatever the initial position, the lagging region will eventually converge to the three leading 
ones. This means, that taking into account the extent of the initial technology gap, the “social capability”   9
of the region is strong enough to reach a steady state development level similar to the one of 
technological leaders. In what follows, only this kind of regions are called “converging” ones. In the 
second case, there is an equilibrium level of the technology gap (1-R
SS), so that the lagging region never 
catches up completely the three best performing European regions even if its level of development is 
initially close to that of the leading ones. This situation is analogous to the findings of Verspagen (1991). 
Within this case, catching up as well as falling back to a lower level of steady state GDP per capita can 
occur. In case 3, the lagging region never catches up to the leading ones. “Social capability” is too low to 
enable a positive growth dynamics. Without an adequate set of policy measures, an inversion of their 
relative impoverishment process turns out to be highly unlikely. 
At this stage, it is worth remembering several facts that underlay our classification. Firstly, given the 
technology gap is calculated with respect to the three best performing regions, the second case does not 
imply that convergence to the European level is an inaccessible objective. Secondly, the steady state 
values of the technology gap suppose that the positions of frontier regions remain unchanged over time 
meaning that their GDP per capita does not improve. This is a relatively restrictive assumption, which 
constitutes an important limit to the analysis. Thirdly, the above classification and especially the levels of 
the steady state GDP per capita are only valid if no exogenous shock such as a new policy measure 
occurs.  
Table 3 indicates to which case each region belongs. In order to achieve a higher degree of homogeneity, 
the second case has been split up into three groups according to the steady state level of the GDP per 
capita ratio R. Therefore, in what follows, we distinguish five different regional groups. Furthermore, 
since within a given group the growth dynamics are not necessarily identical, a regional clustering with 
respect to the most striking common characteristics has been performed.  
Globally, 30 % of European regions should converge to the level of development achieved by the three 
best performing European ones (case 1). In what follows, only regions belonging to this group are 
qualified as “converging”. About 57 % of European regions move to their own steady state level of GDP 
per capita but never catch up the frontier regions (case 2). However, “catching up regions” are expected to 
reach a steady state ratio of GDP per capita relatively close to the one of “converging regions”, whereas 
the contrary prevails for the group of “falling behind regions”. Finally, for 13% of the European regions, 
relative backwardness seems to be a recurrent issue of the growth mechanism.  
As indicated in Table 3, the group of regions converging to the performance level of the technological 
leaders (Bruxelles, Île-de-France and Hamburg) has been split up into three categories according to their 
growth dynamics. “Best performing regions” exhibit low technology gaps and levels of “social 
capability” close to the ones of technological leaders. Beside the German regions Bremen, Oberbayern, 
Stuttgart, Mittelfranken, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe and Düsseldorf, the capital regions Stockholm, Wien, 
Kobenhaven and Uusimaa belong to this category. 
Table 3: Classification of regions on the basis of the estimation output 
Case 1  Case 2  Case 3   10
Regions converging to 
the performance level 
of the technological 
leaders 
R
ss = 1 
α   R





ss ∈  [0,9 ;  0,7] 
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ss ∈  [0,6  ;  0,4] 
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ss ∈  [0,3 ;  0,1] 
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Catching up regions 
ES23-La Rioja 




































































































































































































































































































































































Abbreviations: α  indicates the region’s “social capability” and is defined by equation (10), R
i represents the initial GDP per capita ratio 
defined by equation (5) and R
ss is the steady state GDP per capita ratio given by equation (12). The Danish DK-2 region is an aggregation 
of Vestsjllands amt, StorstrØms amt and Bornholms amt and DK-4 is made up by SØnderjyllands amt, Ribe amt, Vejle amt, RingkØbing amt 
and Viborg amt.  
 
In  “potentially fast converging regions”  “social capability” in terms of qualification and physical 
infrastructure is as important as in best performing regions. However, R&D activities are relatively less 
developed and the average technology gap is about twice as large. According to the technology gap 
literature and consistent with our estimations, these regions are prime candidates for convergence since 
their substantial endowment of “social capability” makes successful adoption of new technology possible.   11
About two thirds of German and Danish regions, one third of Austrian regions as well as the Swedish 
region Västverige exhibit these characteristics. Their process of convergence can be accelerated in 
concentrating regional development policies on R&D activities. For “converging regions”, the diagnostic 
is basically the same as the one for “potentially fast converging regions” but is accentuated in terms of 
R&D deficiencies with respect to leading regions. Global “social capability” endowment is just sufficient 
to permit convergence to the current development level of leading regions.  
Within the group of regions moving towards their own steady state level of GDP per capita, three major 
categories are distinguished in Table 3: catching up regions climbing to a steady state level of GDP 
which is higher than their current one, falling behind regions for which the contrary prevails and 
intermediate regions moving, on average, to a steady state level of GDP per capita half of the one of 
converging regions. “Potentially fast catching up regions” are “best performers” within the catching up 
group. If, on average, their current technology gap is similar to the one of converging regions, a lower 
endowment of “social capability” in the field of qualification as well as R&D activities prevents them 
from converging entirely to the development level of technology leaders. While Île-de-France clearly 
constitutes a technological leader, no French region is converging to the development level of the latter. 
Best performing French regions such as Alsace, Franche-Comté, Rhône-Alpes, Midi-Phyrénées, 
Aquitaine, Auvergne and Bourgogne are only “potential fast catchers up” moving to a steady state level 
of GDP per capita about 25 % below the one of Île-de-France, Bruxelles and Hamburg. For Belgian 
regions, The Netherlands and the remainder of non-converging Danish and Austrian regions a similar 
observation prevails. In comparison to potential fast catching up regions, GDP per capita of “Steady 
regions” is expected to evolve little. Social capability is just enough to maintain the current situation. In 
order to make catching up possible, Provence Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Haute-Normandie should foster 
qualification improvement. While Smland med Öarna ought to concentrate on the development of R&D 
activities, Valle d’Aosta and Liguria need to improve both, qualification and R&D capabilities.  
On average, intermediate regions move towards a steady state level of GDP per capita which represent 
half of the one of technological leaders. However within the group, catching up, steadiness as well as 
declining can be observed. “Catching up regions” exhibit an important technology gap which is much 
higher than the average one of intermediate regions, whereas the contrary can be observed for “social 
capability”. According to the technology gap literature and consistent with our estimations, the 
juxtaposition of these factors makes catching up possible. On average, La Rioja, North West, Limousin, 
Languedoc-Roussillon and Attiki are expected to move from a current average level of relative GDP per 
capita of about 0.49 to a steady state value of 0.60. However, catching up is rather an exception within the 
group of intermediate regions. For the majority of the latter, GDP per capita is expected to evolve little. 
“Steady regions” are characterised by a medium technology gap and a medium level of “social 
capability”. While for French, Italian, United Kingdom’s and Spanish steady regions catching up 
presupposes important qualifications improvements as well as the development of R&D capacities, in 
Nordic regions, policy efforts should be concentrated on the endowment of physical capital. Whatever the 
current technology gap, low “social capability” is the common determinant of “declining regions” 
characterised by a steady state GDP per capita below their current one. Without important policy efforts 
aiming at strengthening “social capability”, about half of United Kingdom’s regions and one third of   12
Italian regions are expected to decline despite their low current technology gap. However, this diagnostic 
should be tempered especially for Italian regions. The “industrial district structure” of their productive 
systems is largely based on informal networks, co-operations on mutual trust (Pyke and Sengenberger 
1992). These region specific endogenous factors considerably speed up technology diffusion, innovation 
adoption and knowledge creation. In such a context, official R&D business expenditure data may 
incorrectly reflect the effective social capability of these regions. 
Belonging to the group of falling behind regions, the above reflections should also moderate the 
relatively problematical position expected for Lombardia, Veneto and Toscana. If on average the current 
GDP per capita of “falling behind regions” is about half the one of technological leaders, it is anticipated 
to move towards a steady state value of about 0.18. Extremely weak R&D capacities and important 
deficiencies in terms of qualification explain the falling behind region’s negative growth dynamics. 
Finally, for losing regions the diagnostic is basically the same as the one for “falling behind regions” but 
is accentuated in terms of physical infrastructure deficiencies. Without an increased effort to raise “social 
capability”, extreme and permanent backwardness seem to be the only perspective for the great majority 
of Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and South Italian regions. 
3.2.  Some salient observations and reflections 
In considering the grouping of regions illustrated in Table 3, it is worth noting some specific 
observations. There is an obvious dichotomy between federalised countries and countries which exhibit a 
more centralised structure. Regions belonging to federalised countries such as Germany, Austria and 
Belgium are performing clearly better than those belonging to countries with a relatively centralised 
structure. This is for instance the case of French regions, which are principally concentrated within groups 
of “intermediate regions” while Île-de-France is one of European leading regions. The message seems 
clear, an increased regional autonomy favours the local development of “social capability”. This is not 
surprising since local authorities are, generally, more aware of local needs and are potentially better 
adapted to satisfy them, than the central authority (Braczyk, Cooke and Heidenreich 1998). However, it 
should be noted that federalism in this context must not be exclusively understood in terms of the legal 
organisation translated in the constitution of a country
12. In our context, federalism refers to “real 
federalism” implying local responses and solutions to local challenges. “Real federalism” is based on the 
existence, at local level, of a high degree of consensus and efficient “private-private”, “private-public” co-
operations characterised by “partnerships” involving local authorities, national government, regional 
authorities, private business and the voluntary sector. With respect to this definition, “legal federalism” is 
not a guarantee for “real federalism” and “real federalism” can occur in “non federal” countries. “Real 
federalism” certainly characterises Germany and Austria but also Denmark and Belgium. In France, 
which is a “decentralised” state, as well as in Spain and Italy, which are “regionalised” countries, “real 
federalism” does not seem to prevail
13.  
Even if it is less straightforward, in considering the clustering of Table 3, another dichotomy can be 
detected between regions belonging to the core of Europe and those situated on the European periphery. 
Ireland, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish regions are essentially classified in the groups of falling behind 
and losing regions. Being more or less far away from the European decision centres, it seems to be   13
relatively difficult for them to attain a level of “social capability” that permits them to catch up. One of 
the reasons that impedes catching up is shown to be the relative shortage of physical infrastructure, 
particularly in the field of transport (Biehl 1986; Keeble et al. 1982, 1988; Baldwin and Forslid 2000)
14. 
Transport networks are still less developed in peripheral countries than in the core of Europe despite 
important external financial support (European Commission 1999). This situation leads to disadvantages 
in terms of transaction costs and economic attractivity, factors that hamper industrial and market service 
development. Where industrial activity is relatively low especially in technology advanced areas, related 
capital investments and know-how embodied in human and physical capital are scarce. In such 
circumstances, the emergence of a “learning economy” (in the sense of Lundvall 1988, 1992) evolving 
towards a “knowledge-based economy” able to compete in the context of globalisation is difficult to 
promote in practice. However, physical infrastructure deficiency even if important, is not the only 
disadvantage of peripheral regions. Distanced form the European decision centres, they encounter 
difficulties to integrate into formal and informal decision-making networks, which are crucial to making 
efficient working business trans-regional strategic alliances and co-operation programs. The peripheral 
situation also represents an important obstacle to benefit from knowledge spillovers and other kinds of 
positive externalities generated within the European core. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Over the last two decades, many studies have been investigating the catching-up hypothesis within the 
European regional landscape. These studies confirm the breakdown of the convergence process after 
1980. If most empirical research in this field is based on single absolute or conditional equation methods 
“à la Barro”, our approach drew on the technology gap literature where “social capability” is considered 
as a prerequisite for convergence. “Social capability” has been approximated by three variables namely, 
the qualification level of the working age population, the physical infrastructure endowment and R&D 
business expenditures. Compared to the traditional convergence approaches, the advantage of our 
framework relies on the explicit causal structure and the incorporation of “social capability” which 
provides interesting insights not available through the estimation of reduced forms. This approach 
enabled us to shed some light on the need of additional efforts to increase “social capability” in order to 
reduce the technology gap and thus to speed up economic convergence. 
Estimated on the basis of 153 European NUTS I and NUTS II regions over the period 1989-1996 (that is 
a sample of regions more than twice as large as the ones used in related studies), the simultaneous 
equation model of cumulative causation developed in this paper lead to the following comments. The rate 
of aggregate output growth was shown to depend positively on the initial technology gap of a region with 
respect to the technology leaders, the employment concentration in industry and services, the endowment 
of physical infrastructure and the qualification level of the working age population. Actually, the relation 
between the economic structure of a region and its growth performance is simultaneous in the sense that 
the growing demand addressed to a region boosts industry and service employment. The effects of 
patenting on the economic structure are similar since the existence within a region of innovative activities 
reflects is ability to absorb technologies developed elsewhere and possibly its capacity to develop its own 
ones - a necessary condition to increase competitiveness and thus industrial and service employment.   14
Finally patenting activity was shown to be positively influenced by R&D expenditures as well as by the 
qualification level of the working age population while the technology gap exerts an opposite effect.  
The estimated coefficients were used to evaluate the different growth patterns currently taken up by the 
European regions. Considering Bruxelles, Hamburg and Île-de-France as references, we evaluated that 
about 30 % of European regions will converge to the level of development achieved by these three best 
performing European regions, 57 % move to their own steady state level of GDP per capita but never 
catch up these frontier regions and for 13% of the European regions, relative backwardness appears to be 
a recurrent issue of the growth mechanism. However, these findings rely on the assumptions that regional 
development policies are not changing over time and that GDP per capita of the three best performing 
regions remain unchanged. An obvious dichotomy between federalised countries and countries which 
exhibit a more centralised structure could also be observed. Regions belonging to countries where “real 
federalism” prevails clearly perform better. Even if less straightforward, another dichotomy could be 
detected between regions belonging to the central core of Europe and regions situated on the European 
periphery. According to our analysis, the latter converge to extremely low levels of steady state GDP per 
capita.  
While our approach allows some interesting insights into the growth mechanism, the results should not be 
taken too literally but rather considered as indications. Probably, the growth performance of some regions 
has been underestimated while that of others may have been overestimated since the ingredients of “social 
capability” are certainly not limited to the variables taken into account in the model. The non-availability 
of more detailed data made it impossible to integrate other components that are however important for a 
complete evaluation of a region’s “social capability” such as, for instance, an appropriated financial 
system, higher education centres and universities and their formal and informal links to networks 
integrating private and public socio-economic agents. The constitution of an European regional database 
in the above mentioned areas would not only enable a deeper insight into the growth forces at work but 
also the implementation of more efficient regional development policies.  
These last comments naturally lead us to some considerations in terms of policy implications. Firstly, it 
was shown that qualification is an important part of social capability in the sense that improvements in 
this field enable the reduction of the technology gap. Secondly, lagging regions still suffer from a relative 
underdevelopment of physical infrastructure. Both elements seem to be partly responsible for the lack of 
innovative activities in lagging regions. Does this consideration mean that the latter are able to catch up in 
concentrating their policy efforts exclusively on qualification or alternatively on physical capital? A real 
improvement of “social capability” in lagging regions probably can not be achieved by adopting a 
dichotomous approach. Increased public incentives to enhance private R&D expenditures in a given 
sector without a simultaneous education and training programme specially adapted to the (latent or 
expressed) needs of the business enterprise sector will probably fail to hit the target. There is urgent need 
for a systemic policy approach not only at both, the national and regional levels but also, and above all, at 
the European level if socio-economic cohesion within Europe should become reality one day.  
Our analysis was essentially based on aspects that refer to “social capability”. An interesting area of 
investigation is certainly “technological congruence”. We consider that the creation of a regional   15
“technological neighbourhood matrix”, although a tricky operation, would represent an important 
contribution to the technological gap literature. Furthermore, an extremely interesting investigation 
consists in introducing into the basic framework, data, that, firstly, reflect the degree of “real federalism” 
within a region and, secondly, the region’s distance with respect to the European decision centres. 
Together, these two elements seem to be influential determinants of a region’s capacity to raise “social 
capability”. Further research in this field will contribute to a better understanding of the growth 
mechanisms of leading as well as of lagging regions. 
NOTES
 
1 In fact, the convergence hypothesis has mostly been expressed with at least some qualifications (Baumol 
1986; Delong 1988; Mankiw et al. 1992; and others). 
2 For an overview of empirical work on catch up and growth, including its theoretical underpinnings, see 
FAGERBERG (1994). 
3 Raw data come from Eurostat. 
4 For reasons of non availability of more desaggregated data, the selection of the three best performing 
regions was based on the regional desaggregation level NUTS II. However, at a more desaggregated 
level, other regions such as München, Frankfurt and London perform better than Bruxelles and Hamburg. 
5 In addition, several alternative measures of the technology gap were tested: technology gap based on the 
technological intensity (ratio of total real R&D expenditures over real GDP), technology gap based on the 
technological base (ratio of total real R&D expenditure over total population) and technology gap based 
on the propensity to patent (ratio of total number of patents over total R&D expenditure or alternatively 
over total population). However since, in general, the time span is relatively long between the moment 
where R&D expenditures are realised and the moment where these expenditures have an impact on 
economic growth, the alternative measures turned out not to be significant with respect to our relatively 
short period. 
6 For reasons of non availability of desegregated data, the variable also includes public services which is 
however supposed to have little influence on technological progress.  
7 Simultaneity is confirmed by the Hausman specification test. 
8 While other proxies such as the density of the telecommunication network would have been best 
candidates to capture the “capital-embodied technology effect”, these variables are not available at the 
regional level. 
9 The system has also been tested by using 3SLS. Statistically, the differences with the FIML estimates 
are not significant. 
10 These average values are respectively 0.25 for the employment rate of highly and moderately working 
population and 0.43 for the technology gap. 
11 Only a non-negative value of R
ss makes sense from an economic viewpoint.  
12 There are only 3 federal states in the European Union: Germany, Austria and Belgium. Italy and Spain 
are “regionalised” countries and France is a “decentralised” country. It is beyond the scope of this work to 
deepen the different legislative implications of these organisational forms but for readers interested in this 
field, the following edition is strongly recommended: DEYON P., (1997), Régionalismes et régions dans 
l’Europe des quinze, Editions locales de France, Bruylant. 
13 The identification of “real federalised” countries is based on an investigation of the delivery system 
developed for the European Structural funds (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1999). In this system, the 
extent of inclusion of local representatives is flexible and at the discretion of Member States. It can be 
reasonably deduced that the extent of inclusion of local authorities complies with the traditional practice 
of authority delegation prevailing in a country. 
14 For an overview of empirical work, investigating the contribution of transportation networks to regional 
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